More Lecture Notes

I got into Chapter 14, Twentieth-Century Functionalism, and specifically Talcott Parsons last time, so I will pick up where I left off....

C. Beyond his early emphasis on "the structure of social action" (which is also the title of his first book), in the 1950s Parsons came to focus on the bigger picture of the social order (Martindale -- move from Social Behaviorism to Macrofunctionalism, p. 349). It is in a book entitled, The Social System, that he most clearly (or turgidly) articulates the so-called "structural-functional framework," which I believe is better captured in the excerpt from Inkeles than in our text.

1. Inkeles observes that the so-called "organismic analogy" -- looking at society, like a biological organism, in terms of structures and functions -- has a long history. Certainly was evident in our discussion of many 19th century sociological theorists, especially Durkheim.

2. The structural-functional view focuses on society as a whole or system, and on the interrelation of INSTITUTIONS moreso than individuals or groups.

3. It contends that what accounts for the persistence and continuity of society, as new generations come and go, is that "societies find means (structures, which) fulfill needs (functions)...of organized social life." (p. 35)

4. Inkeles goes on to observe that the structural-functional view is more concerned with SOCIAL STATICS, or explaining the existing social order (not how it came to be or changes) -- how various institutions function to keep society in operation. ( This supports the view of many commentators that Parsons is a "status quo conservative," ideologically speaking. p. 354 bottom)

a) For example, as Inkeles brings out: the family is an institution set up to "...ensure fulfillment of the functions of sexual reproduction, of early care of the dependent infant, and of his training in the ways of society in which we will live." (this conservative view of the family comes through in the authors' discussion of gender in the text, p. 356).

b.) Structural functionalists also deal with the question of how these institutions are integrated or coordinated to preserve the unity of society, the social organism.

D. Inkeles argues that the most serious complaint against this perspective (which I did not see mentioned in the text) is that structural functionalists often fail to specify for whom or what something is "functional." "What is functional for society may not be functional for the individual." (I am not sure I agree, but...) Inkeles goes on to suggest that the functionalists tend to underemphasize the individual needs relative to the group or society.

E. Inkeles also gets at what I believe is a more serious charge -- it tends to provide a rationalization for the existing institutions and social order -- that what exists is interpreted as functional, therefore, changing or removing an institution would be interpreted as detrimental to society.

1. This is the point at which the so-called "conflict theorists" (including C. Wright Mills) would challenge this perspective. (This criticism is referred to in the Critique and Contributions section, p. 358, but it is not well brought out.)

2. This has to do with Parsons' introduction of the concept of EQUILIBRIUM (which is very inadequately treated on p. 350 in the text). "Homeostasis" is another term for this -- the idea that just as the body regulates, adjusts itself (eg., body temperature, etc.), so too, society has mechanisms that seek to adjust parts of society -- to bring them back into order, stability (Inkeles, pp. 37-38).

a.) Inkeles puts his finger on a number of problems with this equilibrium model as it applies to society, especially how it ignores the role of conflict in society. See, pp. 38-9)

b.) More ammunition to expose the conservative bias built into this equilibrium notion is provided in the following passage from Walter Buckley (a systems' theorist in his own right): "From the many statements made by functionalists, it seemed possible to conclude that since a social system persisting a long time is functionally integrated, or has reached a state of 'equilibrium,' it must have attained an ideal state of adjustment, whether in terms of individual happiness or common welfare. Such a situation, therefore, is evaluated as 'good' and must not be changed: what is, is best, and any change is for the worse." (But Buckley went on to note that, although this has been the interpretation made by some, functionalism can also have radical implications. It all depends on what is defined as a stable, healthy society.)


Robert K. Merton (1910-2003)

A. Of all of Parsons' students/colleagues/defenders, I believe it can be fairly said that Robert Merton left the biggest mark on contemporary American sociology. And he did so in many areas (deviance, methods, etc.), as well as by modifying some aspects of functionalism. It is this latter point that I want to focus on in particular.

B. Merton's contributions to functionalism are discussed under the heading, "Specifying Functionalism" (p. 361). There are three such conceptual specifications that are covered, which I would say have broad application.

1. First, the distinction between MANIFEST and LATENT function. MANIFEST FUNCTION being "the observed or intended outcome." LATENT FUNCTION being "the unintended or unrecognized result."

a.) The authors then proceed to give examples of this from Durkheim and Veblen. Merton apparently referred to Veblen's "Theory of the Leisure Class" and suggested that "accumulation of material possessions had the manifest function of making life more comfortable and the latent function of providing status and prestige." (I am not so sure I agree -- I believe Veblen would have insisted that status and prestige are part of the manifest function of the accumulation of wealth.)

b.) I like the example of Piven and Cloward in their book, Regulating the Poor, where they distinguish between the manifest function of welfare (reducing or eliminating poverty) and the latent function being regulating the poor (that is, give the poor just enough so they will not rebel). This distinction suggests the need to look beneath the appearance of things.

2. Second, the concept of DYSFUNCTION (or negatively functional). Note that in describing this, the authors also note how it responds to an issue Inkeles raised. See middle two paragraphs, p. 362. (let me add, the term, dysfunction, should be in bold print.)

C. The above distinctions (manifest, latent, dysfunction) have implications for Parsons' focus on system equilibrium. See top p. 364.

D. Finally, I believe we need to acknowledge a contribution of Merton's that I know I've made use of in other classes (although I wonder if it was really original with him) -- the concept of a SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY.

1. The authors note how "self-fulfilling prophecy" is connected with another well-known observation of W.I. Thomas: "If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences." See bank example, p. 365. Also, Dr. King -- Belief in racial inferiority justified slavery and later, segregation, and that slavery and segregation kept blacks inferior, which served to rationalize the perpetuation of that unequal system and convince many blacks to accept their second-class status.

E. The bottom line for Merton as regards his modifications to functionalism is that he challenged the accusation that functionalism is inherently conservative.


That brings me up to my comments on Max Horkheimer's "Eclipse of Reason" (the paper I handed out) and Chapter 19, which I will take up in class tomorrow. I will also hand back your papers. Also, do not forget the final essay due next Tuesday, which involves reading those lecture notes of Prof. Ahrens on reserve in the library.