Section IX: Transitions and Challenges
A. In this brief overview of the last several chapters, the authors give a glimpse of the most current trends in sociological theory. Although I certainly welcome the increased attention to women and race, I can't really say that I was terribly impressed with these new developments. I certainly would NOT agree with the assertion that feminist theories and theories of race and colonialism have done anything to resolve longstanding disputes such as the fact-value and micro-macro debates (as brought out in Chapter 19).
B. However, the authors' characterization of Chapter 19 does acknowledge an important point, which is that social movements outside of academia (women's movement, civil rights, anti-war, etc.) had a strong impact on what was happening WITHIN academia.
Chapter 19: Mid-Twentieth-Century Sociology
A. The authors begin by noting some of the momentous changes in the social and cultural life of most Western societies in the late 1950s and 60s.
1. And these changes were paralleled by challenges to the sociological orthodoxy of that era -- mainly structural-functionalism, but also with scientific (mainly quantitative) research. (C. Wright Mills, who, fortunately, is mentioned here, I believe did the best job of critically analyzing this orthodoxy in "The Sociological Imagination" (1959), attacking what he called: "GRAND THEORY" or Parsonian structural functionalism, and "ABSTRACTED EMPIRICISM" or quantitative survey research -- how both fit the existing order and provided no way to critically analyze it or change it.)
2. The authors note how many sociologists got involved in various radical movements.
3. This is not to say that sociologists had any significant or substantial impact on the issues they were involved with.
4. In many ways, this crucial period set the tone for sociology in the late 20th century. Clearly, some of the dominant issues and debates derive from this period.
B. Among these issues and debates, there is none of greater significance than that of FACTS AND VALUES. (Before we launch into this a bit, I'd like to say that the authors do a pretty good job in bringing out the different sides of this debate. Unfortunately, they rely too heavily on some of the weakest, most questionable critics of the value-free approach, namely, Gouldner & Friedrichs.)
1. They begin with Howard Becker's presidential address to the 1960 ASA convention which sort of laid down the gauntlet to those who were questioning sociology as a value-free, empirical science. As quoted: "There is no substitute for remaining in close touch with the empirical evidence, with the 'damned facts.'" (p. 480) This reflected the professional, mainstream sociological position. (such cuss words-damned - are sprinkled on both sides of this debate, as if this lends greater force to their arguments.)
2. The authors go on to note some prominent American critics of the professional, value-free position -- Alfred McClung Lee, Robert Lynd, C. Wright Mills, Alvin Gouldner.
a.) The nature of the challenge to the value-free orthodoxy is captured in reference to Alvin Gouldner -- see middle paragraph, p. 482. (Note the assumption that VALUES and PASSION are considered synonymous, as are REASON and FACTS.)
b.) Of course, the value-free stance did not sit too well with students who were getting involved in various protests. They obviously felt sociology should be relevant to these issues, take a stance on them.
c.) Lurking in the background of all this is Karl Marx (or, I should say, his ghost): "The Marx who was relevant was not, however, the Marx of class conflict but the Marx of alienation." (p. 484) (In one respect, I don't believe this is a valid distinction, but I'm certain what they meant is NOT the later, more scientific Marx, but the earlier more humanistic Marx.)
d.) The first ASA president to embrace the dissenters' view on this issue was Alfred McClung Lee (who later founded the AHS or Association of Humanist Sociologists). He later expanded his presidential address, "Sociology for Whom?" into a book. See overview of his position middle, p. 486.
3. Even though this debate has yet to be resolved, the authors suggest it opened the door to a variety of new approaches.
C. The authors put the next debate (Macro/Micro Perspectives) in the context of Thomas Kuhn's "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and his analysis of PARADIGM CHANGE. Clearly, the fact/value debate also falls under this same heading, as the authors do note, and they also describe the micro/macro debate. See bottom paragraph, p. 488.
1. Although the authors see this macro/micro dichotomy as a "misguided division of the sociological endeavor" (as I also do), it has tended to divide sociologists -- even lead to competition for legitimacy and students (and their fees) -- how truly pathetic!
D. This sets the stage for the last two sections of this chapter -- recent theoretical work which attempts to bridge these divides. In particular, feminist sociological theory and theories of race and colonialism. (But, again, unless I missed something, I did not see much evidence of these new perpectives bridging any divides.)
1. Most of what is discussed in the context of feminist sociological theory is evidence of how women had been discriminated against in academia until fairly recently.
2. The closest thing to any substantive theory is the comment from Simone de Beauvoir about women as "Other." see mid, p. 493.
3. It is not at all clear how feminist theory or research has begun "to transform traditional sociological content, methods, and theoretical perspectives" -- except to critically examine the role of women in society.
4. The sociology of race and colonialism is even less clear. Their account of BLACK MILITANCY and SOCIOLOGY AND RACE is superficial with some big gaps. (eg., no mention of the Kerner Commission Report on rioting in the mid 60s. Gunnar Myrdal's "An American Dilemma" is not mentioned. And they focus on some of the most inconsequential, although vocal, black leaders such as Eldridge Cleaver and Huey Newton, even Stokley Carmichael. Dr. King was actually more "miltant" in his own way than the whole lot put together.)
E. In "Final Thoughts," I guess you could say the authors VERY GENERALLY identify some of the changes these new theories supported. See bottom p. 498-499. But in the end, I don't see the case for some great paradigmatic shift in sociology.
Chapter 24: Final Thoughts on Sociological Theory
A. For the most part, this chapter simply represents a very cursory view of the range of sociological theories and the social and historical conditions they offered explanations of. It is only toward the very end that the authors address some important questions about the relevance of sociological thoery.
B. In the last section on the "Future of Sociological Theory," the authors present some POSTMODERN critiques of the whole sociological enterprise -- critiques which suggest sociological theorists' quest for answers to questions of ORDER in society, of SOCIAL CHANGE, of SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, etc. is illusory -- that the very existence of an objective reality outside one's head, one's perspective, is called into question.
1. This may be an unfairly extreme view of postmodernism, but it is important to acknowledge the authors' (and my own) rejection of it, as the authors put it -- see bottom half, p. 608.
2. Finally, they also underscore that sociological theory is an "unfinished business," but in the end it is meaningless unless it has some bearing on transforming the world for the better. "It is an enterprise that, if it is true to its heritage, must be concerned with the promotion of ways and means to tranform the world, in order to offer dignity, health, and security to all human beings." (p. 609)
________________________
That's it for the text. Next week I'll be blogging notes on Ahrens' lectures.
Friday, April 29, 2011
Family Activity: Making Up Questions for the Final Exam
The families need to get working on making up questions for the final exam, as you did for the midterm. All of you should have a good idea of the kinds of questions I am looking for from having made up questions for the midterm and taken the midterm exam. The second half of the course begins with my "Making Amends II" notes posted on this blog on the second half of Chapter 5 on Marx and Engels. Of course, keep in mind that, especially during these past few weeks, my lecture notes have been posted on the blog. So, there is a lot of blog material from which you can make questions. Also, you may consider making up questions from the various xerox handouts I've distributed in class. I will give you time in class next week, both Tuesday 5/3 & Thursday, 5/5, to confer with your family members. I then want each family to submit FIVE questions and answers to me in writing or via email NO LATER TUESDAY, MAY 10TH BY 4PM. (THIS IS AN ABSOLUTE DEADLINE BECAUSE OUR FINAL EXAM IS SCHEDULED FOR THE FIRST DAY OF FINAL EXAM WEEK.) I will then select at least TWO questions from each family, and for each additional question I accept, that family will earn a bonus point, plus have the advantage of knowing more of the exam. I will then post the questions and answers I accept NO LATER THAN THURSDAY, MAY 12TH AT 1PM on this blog, so you will have this in plenty of time to study for the final exam. Each PARTICIPATING family member will earn 8 points for this exercise, with the possibility of earning bonus points.
Thursday, April 28, 2011
Lecture Notes: Section VIII Intro. & Chapter 16: Critical Theory: The Frankfurt School and Habermas
Section VIII Criticism, Marxism, Change
A. Again, a brief and not very informative introduction. The authors begin by summarizing the previous section as being about "...the more-or-less 'official' twentieth-century conservative capitalist theory and ideology of functionalism." (p. 393)
B. Despite Marxist hopes for the demise of capitalism in the wake of the Russian Revolution, the Great Depression, etc., it did not happen and indeed the Stalinist regime in the Soviet Union led Marxist intellectuals to question it as a model.
C. Hence, the emergence in the 1920s of what is called The Frankfurt School, which attempted to account for the failures and shortcomings of Soviet-style socialism, as well as criticizing Western capitalism, but not strictly on economic grounds. These thinkers drew on other perspectives, especially Freudian psychoanalysis. (eg. Herbert Marcuse's "Eros and Civilization")
Chapter 16: Critical Theory: The Frankfurt School and Habermas
A. Let me preface my remarks on this chapter by observing that, for the most part, I believe the authors did a good job of presenting these ideas in relativiely jargon-free language. I am very familiar with the main Frankfurt School thinkers featured, having read a good many of their basic works. And although I have not gotten into Habermas, based on the authors' analysis, I believe there is much of value there which would warrant reading some of his major works.
B. The authors open the chapter with a very appropriate observation about what inspired many of these thinkers. See opening paragraph, p. 395.
1. And, as the end of the 20th century (and beginning of the 21st) approached, it seemed that capitalism was triumphant and dominant, not likely to be overthrown by a working class. So, how did this come about and what might the future hold? Will the widely recognized drawbacks of capitalism ever be addressed? (Parenthetically, this would be the kind of question someone using the "sociological imagination" would explore.)
C. The Institute for Social Research at the University of Frankfurt was established in 1921 in the wake of Germany's defeat in WW I and what seemed to be promising prospects for a socialist revolution there. It did not happen, of course. In fact, in a little more than a decade, Hitler would rise to power.
1. Many of the thinkers who became associated with the Insitute, such as its director, Max Horkheimer, were Jewish, and with anti-Semitism on the rise in the 1930s, they relocated their basis of operations to Columbia University (1934). Herbert Marcuse and Erich Fromm would go on to become important American social thinkers. (C. Wright Mills also hooked up with them there.)
2. The theorists of the Institute could loosely be described as "critical Marxists," but they represented many different fields -- art, music, literature, philosophy, psychoanalysis, etc. and there was not a unified theoretical perspective.
3. In terms of perspective, the authors describe the Institute's research as SUPRADISCIPLINARY, as they explain in the context of Marxism and their particular historical context. See bottom p. 396 - first paragraph, p. 397.
D. They give a brief biographical sketch of the four leading members -- Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, Fromm (mostly drawn from Martin Jay's fine book: "The Dialectical Imagination").
1. In terms of theoretical background, in addition to Marx of course, they were also influenced by the work of Hegel (by way of Georg Lukacs), Weber, Nietzche, and Freud -- quite an array of figures.
E. Beyond a narrower Marxist focus, these critical theorists were concerned that the whole premise of Enlightenment rationality (of achieving a more rational, liberal, equitable society) had been subverted. Reason had become "rationalization" which, as Max Weber noted, led to a bureaucratized, controlling state -- the "iron cage of rationality."
1. In this context, Max Horkheimer distinguished between two types of reason -- SUBJECTIVE vs. OBJECTIVE. (p. 399, bottom)
a.) SUBJECTIVE REASON, which is simply concerned with figuring out the most appropriate or efficient means to achieve any end or purpose, does not concern itself with the question of whether the purposes or ends are themselves "reasonable," just or equitable. Such INSTRUMENTAL reason, to take an extreme example, could be as easily used by the Nazi extermination industry as by institutions concerned with the elimination of poverty and suffering. (top, p. 400)
1.) And what they saw as the limitations of subjective reason extends to the whole positivist enterprise. See middle two paragraphs, p. 400. (eg. that survey research only deals with surface phenomena, as Mills also argued.)
2.) As I noted in my paper on Horkheimer's "Eclipse of Reason" -- "Subjective reason conforms to anything." (p. 25, Eclipse) And I went on to note -- "More than anything else, the dominance of subjective reason has meant the virtual preclusion of a critical perspective. That is to say, subjective reason provides no basis for criticism of existing social conditions;..."
b.) In contrast, OBJECTIVE REASON refers to reason as an instrument for determining social ends, of figuring out the objective world. This type of reason was the hopeful promise of the Enlightenment, which has, unfortunately, been transformed into instrumental, subjective reason in modern society.
1.) Objective reason insists that fundamental concepts such as truth, justice, right, wrong, etc. have meaning which is discoverable in the world. Thus, objective reason encompasses a CRITICAL perspective -- criticize the existing order of capitalism. (see my paper on "Eclipse of Reason")
2.) This objective reason is connected with EMANICIPATORY THEORY. See first two paragraphs, top, p.401.
F. Although theoretical critique -- emancipatory theory -- might point the way toward change, it does not guarantee it. Indeed, these Frankfurt School theorists were at pains to explain why a revolutionary working class consciousness had not developed. They were generally pessimistic about the prospects for change.
1. Increased consumption, the psychological domination of what they called "mass culture," undermined revolutionary thinking and practice. Georg Lukacs in "History and Class Consciousness" (1922) had observed that the proletariat had become prisoners of bourgeois ideas that capitalism and alienated labor were "natural," to be accepted, not criticized.
2. The authors also point out how these critical theorists saw the realization of Weber's view of the future as a bureaucratized, impersonal world of the iron cage.
G. Herbert Marcuse believed that we might be able to escape from this iron cage by a "GREAT REFUSAL" -- the refusal to buy into consumer society. He was hopeful that the counterculture movement of the 1960s represented this "great refusal." (unfortunately, a misplaced hope)
H. I am much less familiar with the work of Habermas and his particular reformulation along the lines of communication, creating "ideal speech communities." On the surface, it sounds pretty subjective to me. But his analysis of how capitalist society ahd managed to thwart any revolutionary movement is perceptive and consistent with the views of other members of the Frankfurt School. See bottom paragraph, p. 419 - top 2 paragraphs, p. 420.
I. Finally, the authors quote a nice statement from Habermas about how he felt critical theory is true to the origins of sociology. See passage from Habermas near bottom, p. 422.
And, read "Final Thoughts" (pp. 422-423), which I would add is relevant to "sociological imagination" and its relevance for our time.
___________________________
Look for lecture notes on Chapters 19 & 24 soon.
A. Again, a brief and not very informative introduction. The authors begin by summarizing the previous section as being about "...the more-or-less 'official' twentieth-century conservative capitalist theory and ideology of functionalism." (p. 393)
B. Despite Marxist hopes for the demise of capitalism in the wake of the Russian Revolution, the Great Depression, etc., it did not happen and indeed the Stalinist regime in the Soviet Union led Marxist intellectuals to question it as a model.
C. Hence, the emergence in the 1920s of what is called The Frankfurt School, which attempted to account for the failures and shortcomings of Soviet-style socialism, as well as criticizing Western capitalism, but not strictly on economic grounds. These thinkers drew on other perspectives, especially Freudian psychoanalysis. (eg. Herbert Marcuse's "Eros and Civilization")
Chapter 16: Critical Theory: The Frankfurt School and Habermas
A. Let me preface my remarks on this chapter by observing that, for the most part, I believe the authors did a good job of presenting these ideas in relativiely jargon-free language. I am very familiar with the main Frankfurt School thinkers featured, having read a good many of their basic works. And although I have not gotten into Habermas, based on the authors' analysis, I believe there is much of value there which would warrant reading some of his major works.
B. The authors open the chapter with a very appropriate observation about what inspired many of these thinkers. See opening paragraph, p. 395.
1. And, as the end of the 20th century (and beginning of the 21st) approached, it seemed that capitalism was triumphant and dominant, not likely to be overthrown by a working class. So, how did this come about and what might the future hold? Will the widely recognized drawbacks of capitalism ever be addressed? (Parenthetically, this would be the kind of question someone using the "sociological imagination" would explore.)
C. The Institute for Social Research at the University of Frankfurt was established in 1921 in the wake of Germany's defeat in WW I and what seemed to be promising prospects for a socialist revolution there. It did not happen, of course. In fact, in a little more than a decade, Hitler would rise to power.
1. Many of the thinkers who became associated with the Insitute, such as its director, Max Horkheimer, were Jewish, and with anti-Semitism on the rise in the 1930s, they relocated their basis of operations to Columbia University (1934). Herbert Marcuse and Erich Fromm would go on to become important American social thinkers. (C. Wright Mills also hooked up with them there.)
2. The theorists of the Institute could loosely be described as "critical Marxists," but they represented many different fields -- art, music, literature, philosophy, psychoanalysis, etc. and there was not a unified theoretical perspective.
3. In terms of perspective, the authors describe the Institute's research as SUPRADISCIPLINARY, as they explain in the context of Marxism and their particular historical context. See bottom p. 396 - first paragraph, p. 397.
D. They give a brief biographical sketch of the four leading members -- Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, Fromm (mostly drawn from Martin Jay's fine book: "The Dialectical Imagination").
1. In terms of theoretical background, in addition to Marx of course, they were also influenced by the work of Hegel (by way of Georg Lukacs), Weber, Nietzche, and Freud -- quite an array of figures.
E. Beyond a narrower Marxist focus, these critical theorists were concerned that the whole premise of Enlightenment rationality (of achieving a more rational, liberal, equitable society) had been subverted. Reason had become "rationalization" which, as Max Weber noted, led to a bureaucratized, controlling state -- the "iron cage of rationality."
1. In this context, Max Horkheimer distinguished between two types of reason -- SUBJECTIVE vs. OBJECTIVE. (p. 399, bottom)
a.) SUBJECTIVE REASON, which is simply concerned with figuring out the most appropriate or efficient means to achieve any end or purpose, does not concern itself with the question of whether the purposes or ends are themselves "reasonable," just or equitable. Such INSTRUMENTAL reason, to take an extreme example, could be as easily used by the Nazi extermination industry as by institutions concerned with the elimination of poverty and suffering. (top, p. 400)
1.) And what they saw as the limitations of subjective reason extends to the whole positivist enterprise. See middle two paragraphs, p. 400. (eg. that survey research only deals with surface phenomena, as Mills also argued.)
2.) As I noted in my paper on Horkheimer's "Eclipse of Reason" -- "Subjective reason conforms to anything." (p. 25, Eclipse) And I went on to note -- "More than anything else, the dominance of subjective reason has meant the virtual preclusion of a critical perspective. That is to say, subjective reason provides no basis for criticism of existing social conditions;..."
b.) In contrast, OBJECTIVE REASON refers to reason as an instrument for determining social ends, of figuring out the objective world. This type of reason was the hopeful promise of the Enlightenment, which has, unfortunately, been transformed into instrumental, subjective reason in modern society.
1.) Objective reason insists that fundamental concepts such as truth, justice, right, wrong, etc. have meaning which is discoverable in the world. Thus, objective reason encompasses a CRITICAL perspective -- criticize the existing order of capitalism. (see my paper on "Eclipse of Reason")
2.) This objective reason is connected with EMANICIPATORY THEORY. See first two paragraphs, top, p.401.
F. Although theoretical critique -- emancipatory theory -- might point the way toward change, it does not guarantee it. Indeed, these Frankfurt School theorists were at pains to explain why a revolutionary working class consciousness had not developed. They were generally pessimistic about the prospects for change.
1. Increased consumption, the psychological domination of what they called "mass culture," undermined revolutionary thinking and practice. Georg Lukacs in "History and Class Consciousness" (1922) had observed that the proletariat had become prisoners of bourgeois ideas that capitalism and alienated labor were "natural," to be accepted, not criticized.
2. The authors also point out how these critical theorists saw the realization of Weber's view of the future as a bureaucratized, impersonal world of the iron cage.
G. Herbert Marcuse believed that we might be able to escape from this iron cage by a "GREAT REFUSAL" -- the refusal to buy into consumer society. He was hopeful that the counterculture movement of the 1960s represented this "great refusal." (unfortunately, a misplaced hope)
H. I am much less familiar with the work of Habermas and his particular reformulation along the lines of communication, creating "ideal speech communities." On the surface, it sounds pretty subjective to me. But his analysis of how capitalist society ahd managed to thwart any revolutionary movement is perceptive and consistent with the views of other members of the Frankfurt School. See bottom paragraph, p. 419 - top 2 paragraphs, p. 420.
I. Finally, the authors quote a nice statement from Habermas about how he felt critical theory is true to the origins of sociology. See passage from Habermas near bottom, p. 422.
And, read "Final Thoughts" (pp. 422-423), which I would add is relevant to "sociological imagination" and its relevance for our time.
___________________________
Look for lecture notes on Chapters 19 & 24 soon.
Monday, April 25, 2011
Lecture Notes: Intro. Section VII & Chapter 14: Twentieth-Century Functionalism: Parsons and Merton
Section VII: Twentieth-Century Functionalism and Beyond
A. This introduction is surprisingly weak, considering the fact that functionalism is one of the dominant sociological theories of the 20th century. It's a theory whose principal concern is ORDER in society, exploring the functions of various elements of society -- how the various elements or parts are integrated in the larger whole of society.
Chapter 14: Twentieth-Century Functionalism: Parsons and Merton
(Even though the authors cover some basic concepts Parsons introduced, overall I don't believe they did a good job presenting his overall view of society, or the more important criticisms of his theory. So, I am going to present Parsons' thought based more on a short piece by Alex Inkeles (which I'll hand out in class) and then draw on the text wherever relevant.)
Talcott Parsons (1902-1979)
A. Despite the difficulty of his writing style (discussed on p. 348) and the wide criticism of his theories, Talcott Parsons was one of the most important sociological theorists America has produced.
1. Although it took him a while to break into the Sociology Dept. at Harvard (9 years as an untenured instructor), he eventually became chairman of that department which was re-named the Department of Social Relations under his leadership. As chairman, he had a hand in turning out some of the most prominent American sociologists of the past century, such as Robert Merton. Parsons even made the cover of Time magazine on the occasion of his death in 1979, something not too many sociologists have done.
2. In his earliest major work, "The Structure of Social Action," (briefly mentioned and discussed on p. 349), Parsons accomplished THREE things: (a) First, he introduced an American audience to the work of some of the great European sociologists whose work had been largely neglected to this point (1937) -- namely, Durkheim, Weber, and Pareto. His commentary on Durkheim was well over 100 pages alone, and very insightful and comprehensive. He felt these thinkers were converging on a comprehensive theory of social action, which he went on to articulate in his book. (I would also mention that Parsons translated some of Weber's works.)
(b) Second, Parsons was one of the first American sociologists to take seriously the notion that SOCIETY IS A SYSTEM, which is to say, he embraced SOCIAL REALISM. (c) Third, in his theory of social action, he tried to integrate aspects of psychology (Freud), anthropology, and sociology (i.e., individual/inner, culture, and society).
3. But beyond this early emphasis on social action, after WWII, he came to focus more on the bigger picture of the social order (what Don Martindale described as a move from "Social Behaviorism" to "Macrofunctionalism," p. 349). It is in a book entitled, "The Social System," that he most clearly (or turgidly, according to critics like Mills) articulated the STRUCTURAL-FUNCTIONAL framework, which I believe is better captured in the excerpt from Inkeles than in our text.
a.) Inkeles observes that the so-called "ORGANISMIC ANALOGY" -- looking at society like a biological organism in terms of structures and functions -- has a long history. It certainly was evident in our discussion of many 19th-century sociological theorists.
b.) The structural functional view focuses on society as a whole or a system (like an organism), and on the interrelation of INSTITUTIONS moreso than on individuals or groups.
c.) It contends that what accounts for the persistence and continuity of society, as new generations come and go, is because "societies find means (structures) (which) fulfill needs (functions)...of organized social life." (p. 35, handout)
d.) Inkeles goes on to observe that the structural-functional view is more concerned with "social statics" or explaining the existing social order (not how it came to be or how it changes, though) -- how various institutions function to keep society in operation. (This supports the view of many commentators -- that Parsons is a "status quo conservative," ideologically speaking. see bottom, p. 354)
1.) Eg. as Inkeles brings out: the family is an institution set up to "...ensure fulfillment of the functions of sexual reproduction, of early care of the dependent infant, and of his training in the ways of society in which he will live." (p. 35, handout) (This conservative view of the family also comes through in the authors' discussion of gender, p. 356.)
2.) Structural-functionalists also deal with the question of how these institutions are integrated or co-ordinated to preserve the unity of society (the social organism).
e.) Inkeles argues that the most serious complaint against this perspective (which I did not notice being mentioned in the text) is that structural-functionalists often fail to specify FOR WHOM OR WHAT SOMETHING IS "FUNCTIONAL." "What is functional for society may not be functional for the individual." He goes on to suggest that the functionalists tend to underemphasize the individual's needs relative to the group or society.
f.) Inkeles also gets at what I believe is a more serious charge -- that it tends to provide a rationalization for the exisiting institutions and social order -- that what exists is interpreted as functional, therefore, changing or removing an institution would be interpreted as detrimental to society.
1.) This is the point at which the so-called "conflict theorists" (including C. Wrigh Mills) would challenge this perspective. (This criticism is referred to in the "Critique and Contributions" section (p. 358), but it is not brought out very well.)
2.) This has to do with Parsons' introduction of the concept of EQUILIBRIUM (which is very inadequately treated in the text, p. 350) "Homeostasis" is another term for this -- the idea that just as the body regulates, adjusts itself (eg., body temperature, etc.), so too, society has mechanisms that seek to adjust parts of society -- to bring them back into order and stability. See last paragraph, p. 37- most of p. 38, handout.
a.) Inkeles, then, puts his finger on a number of problems with this equilibrium model as it applies to society, especially how it ignores the role of conflict in society. (See last paragraph, p. 38-39, handout)
More ammunition to expose the conservative bias built into this equilibrium model is provided in the following passage from systems' theorist, Walter Buckley:
"From the many statements made by functionalists, it seemed possible to conclude that since a social system persisting a long time is functionally integrated, or has reached a state of 'equilibrium' it must have attained an ideal state of adjustment, whether in terms of individual happiness or common welfare. Such a situation, therefore, is evaluated as 'good' and must not be changed: what is, is best, and any change is for the worse."
But Buckley went on to note that, although this has been the interpretation made by some, functionalism can also have radical implications. It all depends on what is defined as a stable, healthy society.
Robert K. Merton (1910-2003) and like his mentor, Merton's death was widely reported on.
A. Of all of Parsons' students/colleagues/defenders, I believe it can be fairly said that Robert Merton left the biggest mark on contemporary American society. And he did so in many areas (deviance, methods, etc.), as well as by modifying some aspects of functionalism. It is this latter point that I want to focus on in particular.
B. Merton's contributions to functionalism are discussed under the heading, "Specifying Functionalism" (p. 361). There are THREE such conceptual specifications that are covered, which I would say have broad application.
1. First, the distinction between MANIFEST and LATENT FUNCTIONS: manifest function being "the observed or intended outcome," and latent function being "the unintended or unrecognized result."
a.) The authors, then, proceed to give examples of this from Durkheim and Veblen. Apparently, Merton referred to Veblen's "Theory of the Leisure Class," and suggested that: "accumulation of material possessions had the manifest function of making life more comfortable and the latent function of providing status and prestige (i.e., "conspicuous consumption")." (I am not so sure -- I believe Veblen would have insisted that status and prestige is the manifest function of the accumulation of wealth.)
b.) I like an example that comes from Piven & Cloward's book, "Regulating the Poor," in which they distinguish between the manifest function of welfare (reducing or eliminating poverty) and the latent function being regulating the poor (give the poor enough so as not to rebel), which they regarded as its primary function.
c.) In general, this distinction suggests that we not acccept things at face value; that we look beneath the appearance of things.
2. Second, the concept of DYSFUNCTION (which should be in bold print in the text) or negatively functional. Note that in describing this, the authors also note how it responds to an issue Inkeles raised about functionalism. See middle two paragraphs, p. 362.
The above distinctions (manifest/latent & dysfunction) have implications for Parsons' focus on system equilibrium. See top paragraph, p. 364.
3. Finally, I believe we need to acknowledge a contribution of Merton's that I know I've made use of (although I am not so sure it was original with him) -- the concept of SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY.
a.) The authors note that this notion of the "self-fulfilling prophecy" is connected with another well-known observation of W.I. Thomas: "If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences."
1.) Note bank example, p. 365.
I would say the BOTTOM LINE with Merton is that, in various ways, he was challenging the accusation that functionalism was inherently conservative.
___________________________________
That's all for now. You might want to print these notes out, as well as the previous notes posted on the two previous blog posts on Chapters 12 & 13.
A. This introduction is surprisingly weak, considering the fact that functionalism is one of the dominant sociological theories of the 20th century. It's a theory whose principal concern is ORDER in society, exploring the functions of various elements of society -- how the various elements or parts are integrated in the larger whole of society.
Chapter 14: Twentieth-Century Functionalism: Parsons and Merton
(Even though the authors cover some basic concepts Parsons introduced, overall I don't believe they did a good job presenting his overall view of society, or the more important criticisms of his theory. So, I am going to present Parsons' thought based more on a short piece by Alex Inkeles (which I'll hand out in class) and then draw on the text wherever relevant.)
Talcott Parsons (1902-1979)
A. Despite the difficulty of his writing style (discussed on p. 348) and the wide criticism of his theories, Talcott Parsons was one of the most important sociological theorists America has produced.
1. Although it took him a while to break into the Sociology Dept. at Harvard (9 years as an untenured instructor), he eventually became chairman of that department which was re-named the Department of Social Relations under his leadership. As chairman, he had a hand in turning out some of the most prominent American sociologists of the past century, such as Robert Merton. Parsons even made the cover of Time magazine on the occasion of his death in 1979, something not too many sociologists have done.
2. In his earliest major work, "The Structure of Social Action," (briefly mentioned and discussed on p. 349), Parsons accomplished THREE things: (a) First, he introduced an American audience to the work of some of the great European sociologists whose work had been largely neglected to this point (1937) -- namely, Durkheim, Weber, and Pareto. His commentary on Durkheim was well over 100 pages alone, and very insightful and comprehensive. He felt these thinkers were converging on a comprehensive theory of social action, which he went on to articulate in his book. (I would also mention that Parsons translated some of Weber's works.)
(b) Second, Parsons was one of the first American sociologists to take seriously the notion that SOCIETY IS A SYSTEM, which is to say, he embraced SOCIAL REALISM. (c) Third, in his theory of social action, he tried to integrate aspects of psychology (Freud), anthropology, and sociology (i.e., individual/inner, culture, and society).
3. But beyond this early emphasis on social action, after WWII, he came to focus more on the bigger picture of the social order (what Don Martindale described as a move from "Social Behaviorism" to "Macrofunctionalism," p. 349). It is in a book entitled, "The Social System," that he most clearly (or turgidly, according to critics like Mills) articulated the STRUCTURAL-FUNCTIONAL framework, which I believe is better captured in the excerpt from Inkeles than in our text.
a.) Inkeles observes that the so-called "ORGANISMIC ANALOGY" -- looking at society like a biological organism in terms of structures and functions -- has a long history. It certainly was evident in our discussion of many 19th-century sociological theorists.
b.) The structural functional view focuses on society as a whole or a system (like an organism), and on the interrelation of INSTITUTIONS moreso than on individuals or groups.
c.) It contends that what accounts for the persistence and continuity of society, as new generations come and go, is because "societies find means (structures) (which) fulfill needs (functions)...of organized social life." (p. 35, handout)
d.) Inkeles goes on to observe that the structural-functional view is more concerned with "social statics" or explaining the existing social order (not how it came to be or how it changes, though) -- how various institutions function to keep society in operation. (This supports the view of many commentators -- that Parsons is a "status quo conservative," ideologically speaking. see bottom, p. 354)
1.) Eg. as Inkeles brings out: the family is an institution set up to "...ensure fulfillment of the functions of sexual reproduction, of early care of the dependent infant, and of his training in the ways of society in which he will live." (p. 35, handout) (This conservative view of the family also comes through in the authors' discussion of gender, p. 356.)
2.) Structural-functionalists also deal with the question of how these institutions are integrated or co-ordinated to preserve the unity of society (the social organism).
e.) Inkeles argues that the most serious complaint against this perspective (which I did not notice being mentioned in the text) is that structural-functionalists often fail to specify FOR WHOM OR WHAT SOMETHING IS "FUNCTIONAL." "What is functional for society may not be functional for the individual." He goes on to suggest that the functionalists tend to underemphasize the individual's needs relative to the group or society.
f.) Inkeles also gets at what I believe is a more serious charge -- that it tends to provide a rationalization for the exisiting institutions and social order -- that what exists is interpreted as functional, therefore, changing or removing an institution would be interpreted as detrimental to society.
1.) This is the point at which the so-called "conflict theorists" (including C. Wrigh Mills) would challenge this perspective. (This criticism is referred to in the "Critique and Contributions" section (p. 358), but it is not brought out very well.)
2.) This has to do with Parsons' introduction of the concept of EQUILIBRIUM (which is very inadequately treated in the text, p. 350) "Homeostasis" is another term for this -- the idea that just as the body regulates, adjusts itself (eg., body temperature, etc.), so too, society has mechanisms that seek to adjust parts of society -- to bring them back into order and stability. See last paragraph, p. 37- most of p. 38, handout.
a.) Inkeles, then, puts his finger on a number of problems with this equilibrium model as it applies to society, especially how it ignores the role of conflict in society. (See last paragraph, p. 38-39, handout)
More ammunition to expose the conservative bias built into this equilibrium model is provided in the following passage from systems' theorist, Walter Buckley:
"From the many statements made by functionalists, it seemed possible to conclude that since a social system persisting a long time is functionally integrated, or has reached a state of 'equilibrium' it must have attained an ideal state of adjustment, whether in terms of individual happiness or common welfare. Such a situation, therefore, is evaluated as 'good' and must not be changed: what is, is best, and any change is for the worse."
But Buckley went on to note that, although this has been the interpretation made by some, functionalism can also have radical implications. It all depends on what is defined as a stable, healthy society.
Robert K. Merton (1910-2003) and like his mentor, Merton's death was widely reported on.
A. Of all of Parsons' students/colleagues/defenders, I believe it can be fairly said that Robert Merton left the biggest mark on contemporary American society. And he did so in many areas (deviance, methods, etc.), as well as by modifying some aspects of functionalism. It is this latter point that I want to focus on in particular.
B. Merton's contributions to functionalism are discussed under the heading, "Specifying Functionalism" (p. 361). There are THREE such conceptual specifications that are covered, which I would say have broad application.
1. First, the distinction between MANIFEST and LATENT FUNCTIONS: manifest function being "the observed or intended outcome," and latent function being "the unintended or unrecognized result."
a.) The authors, then, proceed to give examples of this from Durkheim and Veblen. Apparently, Merton referred to Veblen's "Theory of the Leisure Class," and suggested that: "accumulation of material possessions had the manifest function of making life more comfortable and the latent function of providing status and prestige (i.e., "conspicuous consumption")." (I am not so sure -- I believe Veblen would have insisted that status and prestige is the manifest function of the accumulation of wealth.)
b.) I like an example that comes from Piven & Cloward's book, "Regulating the Poor," in which they distinguish between the manifest function of welfare (reducing or eliminating poverty) and the latent function being regulating the poor (give the poor enough so as not to rebel), which they regarded as its primary function.
c.) In general, this distinction suggests that we not acccept things at face value; that we look beneath the appearance of things.
2. Second, the concept of DYSFUNCTION (which should be in bold print in the text) or negatively functional. Note that in describing this, the authors also note how it responds to an issue Inkeles raised about functionalism. See middle two paragraphs, p. 362.
The above distinctions (manifest/latent & dysfunction) have implications for Parsons' focus on system equilibrium. See top paragraph, p. 364.
3. Finally, I believe we need to acknowledge a contribution of Merton's that I know I've made use of (although I am not so sure it was original with him) -- the concept of SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY.
a.) The authors note that this notion of the "self-fulfilling prophecy" is connected with another well-known observation of W.I. Thomas: "If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences."
1.) Note bank example, p. 365.
I would say the BOTTOM LINE with Merton is that, in various ways, he was challenging the accusation that functionalism was inherently conservative.
___________________________________
That's all for now. You might want to print these notes out, as well as the previous notes posted on the two previous blog posts on Chapters 12 & 13.
Sunday, April 24, 2011
Lecture Notes: Chapter 13: Society, Self, and Mind: Cooley, Mead, and Freud
A. The authors open this chapter with a point that I have to agree with:
"When sociology teachers complain that they are having trouble getting their students to think sociologically, they usually mean getting them to think about society as a whole. In the United States we are more attuned to individual-level explanations." (p. 310)
1. And Cooley, Mead and Freud certainly provide insight into the individual-level (or group-level) interaction, although I would insist that they were also aware of that larger social environment which plays a role in the development of individuals.
Charles Horton Cooley (1864-1929)
A. He grew up, was educated, and taught at the University of Michigan. In 1918 he became President of the American Sociological Society. His work helped lay the foundation for social psychology and symbolic interactionism.
1. Cooley was influenced by Spencer but did not agree with his more wholistic, organismic analogy. He argued that Spencer did not appreciate the significance of individual interaction.
B. "Sociological concepts, for Cooley, must be anchored in the real social world of interacting individuals." (p. 312) At one point, the authors describe Cooley's understanding of social life as "mentalistic."
C. Three key concepts/contributions for Cooley.
1. "Looking-glass self" -- That is, our sense of who we are is developed in reference to others. You understand yourself, who you are, in terms of your understanding of what others think or imagine you to be.
2. How people choose to define you, look upon you -- as a criminal, nerd, star, etc. -- will likely determine your identity. Creates what is called a "self-fulfilling prophecy," a concept that is especially relevant in terms of racial identity and stereotyping. (Even though it is not until we get to Merton in Chap. 14 that the authors talk about this concept of the self-fulfilling prophecy.)
3. And these individual interactions usually take place in "primary groups," or groups "characterized by intimate, face-to-face association and cooperation." (p. 313) And note what Cooley goes on to say about the fundamental role of the primary group (bottom, p. 313). Then, in the next paragraph at the top of p. 314, the authors draw a very important implication from this: "If primary groups are critical to human social and moral development, and to solidarity with others, then any threat to an individual's contact with significant primary groups (such as the family) will result in problems for individuals and society. Thus, it is very important that the child not be deprived of consistent, long-term contacts in early years." (p. 314)
George Herbert Mead (1863-1931)
A. Although there are several references to it, there is no direct mention of his major work which is his main claim to fame in sociology, "Mind, Self, and Society," published 3 years after his death in 1934, and it really was put together from notes taken by his graduate students.
B. Mead himself was a philosopher and two of his most important influences were pragmatist philosopher, William James (also an influence on Cooley) and German psychologist, Wilhelm Wundt, from which Mead came to appreciate the role of gestures, sympbols, signs in human communication and interaction.
C. The authors do a good job of presenting a very basic aspect of Mead's thought, which is crucial to the later development of symbolic interactionism: that is his view of personality development being socially determined, involving three distinct stages which all hinge on the concept of "ROLE-TAKING." (which the authors do not define as such)
1. Those three stages being: PLAY, GAME, and "GENERALIZED OTHER," generalized other being the most significant. It represents the culmination of this process of self-development through role taking (or taking the role of the other and seeing yourself from the other's point of view). This represents the "synthesized view" of others' attitudes and expectations built up over a long period of time. Primary group interactions especially. I've always thought of the "generalized other" as similar to the conscience or Freud's "SUPER-EGO." (See, p. 322)
D. The authors go on to note that because of Mead's emphasis on mind and self, we tend to overlook his views on the nature of society. Mind and self only develop in the context of society, society itself being basically an outgrowth of individuals interacting. It was Mead's student, Herbert Blumer, in a seminal essay, "Society as Symbolic Interaction," (1937) who develops some of the societal implications of this theory of personality development.
Sigmund Freud (1856-1939)
A. Without getting into the real nitty-gritty of psychoanalysis and the explanation it offers for various psychological disorders, I believe it is important to have a general overview of the Freudian view of the personality structure or psyche, and the sociological implications of that view for the relation of the individual and society (or civilization). This sociological dimension comes through in his book, "Civilization and Its Discontents" (1930).
B. I defer to the authors' succinct overview of the three elements of the personality structure -- the ID, SUPER-EGO, and EGO. See this section, bottom p. 330 - 331.
C. In terms of the impact of civilization, Freud saw it as coercive, controlling our basic instinctual drives -- EROS - sexual; THANATOS - aggressive or death instinct. In the end, civilization is something that makes us sick or unhappy in that it necessarily represses these instinctual drives. This basic point is well-captured by the authors, see middle paragraph, p. 332.
"Freud and the Fundamentalist Urge"
A. This recent commentary brings out some of Freud's insights into culture and politics, which reflect his thinking during the last phase of his life.
B. The commentary also includes another overview of the Freudian view of the psyche. See second page, middle of the first column.
1. Freud argued that we deal with the inevitable conflict in the psyche in various ways -- intoxication, romantic love.
2. Notes how the tyrant has an erotic relationship to the crowd. The tyrant takes the place of the "over-I" or superego in the psyche of followers. People's yearning for a simple, clear direction from the superego leads them to embrace the tyrant. Nice description of such a tyrant and what he provides for the people, see top, p. 3.
3. In a sense, Freud saw a middle way (between tyranny and anarchy), a path that acknowledges the need to live and deal with tension and conflict which really describes the job of the ego, and which is preferable. In this regard, we should be suspicious of "feel-good-politics."
C. The author of this commentary concludes by applying this insight to the so-called "war on terror" -- the danger of fighting fundamentalist terrorists by embracing fundamentalism ourselves and turning a blind eye to the shortcomings of our leaders. See last paragraph of the commentary, p. 3.
______________________________
That brings us up to the Introduction to Section VII and Chapter 14.
"When sociology teachers complain that they are having trouble getting their students to think sociologically, they usually mean getting them to think about society as a whole. In the United States we are more attuned to individual-level explanations." (p. 310)
1. And Cooley, Mead and Freud certainly provide insight into the individual-level (or group-level) interaction, although I would insist that they were also aware of that larger social environment which plays a role in the development of individuals.
Charles Horton Cooley (1864-1929)
A. He grew up, was educated, and taught at the University of Michigan. In 1918 he became President of the American Sociological Society. His work helped lay the foundation for social psychology and symbolic interactionism.
1. Cooley was influenced by Spencer but did not agree with his more wholistic, organismic analogy. He argued that Spencer did not appreciate the significance of individual interaction.
B. "Sociological concepts, for Cooley, must be anchored in the real social world of interacting individuals." (p. 312) At one point, the authors describe Cooley's understanding of social life as "mentalistic."
C. Three key concepts/contributions for Cooley.
1. "Looking-glass self" -- That is, our sense of who we are is developed in reference to others. You understand yourself, who you are, in terms of your understanding of what others think or imagine you to be.
2. How people choose to define you, look upon you -- as a criminal, nerd, star, etc. -- will likely determine your identity. Creates what is called a "self-fulfilling prophecy," a concept that is especially relevant in terms of racial identity and stereotyping. (Even though it is not until we get to Merton in Chap. 14 that the authors talk about this concept of the self-fulfilling prophecy.)
3. And these individual interactions usually take place in "primary groups," or groups "characterized by intimate, face-to-face association and cooperation." (p. 313) And note what Cooley goes on to say about the fundamental role of the primary group (bottom, p. 313). Then, in the next paragraph at the top of p. 314, the authors draw a very important implication from this: "If primary groups are critical to human social and moral development, and to solidarity with others, then any threat to an individual's contact with significant primary groups (such as the family) will result in problems for individuals and society. Thus, it is very important that the child not be deprived of consistent, long-term contacts in early years." (p. 314)
George Herbert Mead (1863-1931)
A. Although there are several references to it, there is no direct mention of his major work which is his main claim to fame in sociology, "Mind, Self, and Society," published 3 years after his death in 1934, and it really was put together from notes taken by his graduate students.
B. Mead himself was a philosopher and two of his most important influences were pragmatist philosopher, William James (also an influence on Cooley) and German psychologist, Wilhelm Wundt, from which Mead came to appreciate the role of gestures, sympbols, signs in human communication and interaction.
C. The authors do a good job of presenting a very basic aspect of Mead's thought, which is crucial to the later development of symbolic interactionism: that is his view of personality development being socially determined, involving three distinct stages which all hinge on the concept of "ROLE-TAKING." (which the authors do not define as such)
1. Those three stages being: PLAY, GAME, and "GENERALIZED OTHER," generalized other being the most significant. It represents the culmination of this process of self-development through role taking (or taking the role of the other and seeing yourself from the other's point of view). This represents the "synthesized view" of others' attitudes and expectations built up over a long period of time. Primary group interactions especially. I've always thought of the "generalized other" as similar to the conscience or Freud's "SUPER-EGO." (See, p. 322)
D. The authors go on to note that because of Mead's emphasis on mind and self, we tend to overlook his views on the nature of society. Mind and self only develop in the context of society, society itself being basically an outgrowth of individuals interacting. It was Mead's student, Herbert Blumer, in a seminal essay, "Society as Symbolic Interaction," (1937) who develops some of the societal implications of this theory of personality development.
Sigmund Freud (1856-1939)
A. Without getting into the real nitty-gritty of psychoanalysis and the explanation it offers for various psychological disorders, I believe it is important to have a general overview of the Freudian view of the personality structure or psyche, and the sociological implications of that view for the relation of the individual and society (or civilization). This sociological dimension comes through in his book, "Civilization and Its Discontents" (1930).
B. I defer to the authors' succinct overview of the three elements of the personality structure -- the ID, SUPER-EGO, and EGO. See this section, bottom p. 330 - 331.
C. In terms of the impact of civilization, Freud saw it as coercive, controlling our basic instinctual drives -- EROS - sexual; THANATOS - aggressive or death instinct. In the end, civilization is something that makes us sick or unhappy in that it necessarily represses these instinctual drives. This basic point is well-captured by the authors, see middle paragraph, p. 332.
"Freud and the Fundamentalist Urge"
A. This recent commentary brings out some of Freud's insights into culture and politics, which reflect his thinking during the last phase of his life.
B. The commentary also includes another overview of the Freudian view of the psyche. See second page, middle of the first column.
1. Freud argued that we deal with the inevitable conflict in the psyche in various ways -- intoxication, romantic love.
2. Notes how the tyrant has an erotic relationship to the crowd. The tyrant takes the place of the "over-I" or superego in the psyche of followers. People's yearning for a simple, clear direction from the superego leads them to embrace the tyrant. Nice description of such a tyrant and what he provides for the people, see top, p. 3.
3. In a sense, Freud saw a middle way (between tyranny and anarchy), a path that acknowledges the need to live and deal with tension and conflict which really describes the job of the ego, and which is preferable. In this regard, we should be suspicious of "feel-good-politics."
C. The author of this commentary concludes by applying this insight to the so-called "war on terror" -- the danger of fighting fundamentalist terrorists by embracing fundamentalism ourselves and turning a blind eye to the shortcomings of our leaders. See last paragraph of the commentary, p. 3.
______________________________
That brings us up to the Introduction to Section VII and Chapter 14.
Friday, April 22, 2011
Lecture Notes: Remainder of Chapter 12: DuBois
Imperialism, Colonialism, and War
A. DuBois shared Lenin's belief that IMPERIALISM basically represented the global reach of capitalist exploitation, focusing on how various European powers had carved up and where exploiting Africa for its raw materials and cheap labor.
1. Imperialism and colonialism sort of go hand-in-hand. And in Africa this gets rationalized by appealing to race theory -- notions of the racial inferiority of Blacks. See bottom paragraph, p. 295.
2. This is also linked to war -- "central to imperialist capitalism is war." (p. 296). He recognizes Veblen's point on sabotage and destruction of resources. And the cause of war (especially WW I)? See middle paragraph p. 296.
3. Nonehteless, he did not believe colonialism was here to stay. He predicted the emergence of independence movements in Africa and elsewhere as the major powers exhausted themselves in war.
Social Organization and Culture
A. "DuBois argued that the basic element in social organization is oppression,..." Referred to this as the MANURE theory of social organization. "By this, he meant the dregs of humanity are considered fit only to do tasks that no human being ought to have to do." Which leads into his "Theory of Exclusiveness" -- "...a feeling that the world progresses by a process of excluding from the benefits of culture the majority of men, so that a gifted minority may blossom." (blossom from the manure, that is) (p. 297)
B. Nonetheless, he certainly believed darker peoples had contributed to civilization development -- it is just that these contributions had been obscured by the ideology of white supremacy. (eg., regarding Egyptian civilization as a prime example of black African contributions, which I would add is a controversial claim even today.)
Leadership and Power
A. Nothing significant here, although when he talks about leaders mirroring the values and attributes most prized by their society, note the values and attributes he identifies as American -- "wealth, show, impudence." -- not very flattering and again sounding like Veblen.
B. "DOUBLE-CONSCIOUSNESS" -- this is a key concept for DuBois, which has resonated throughout African American history. As he describes it -- see bottom p. 298 - 299.
NATURE OF SOCIETY, HUMANS, AND CHANGE
A. Notes that DuBois exposed HISTORY AS IDEOLOGY -- how historians had unanimously argued that Blacks were responsible for the failure of Reconstruction and their subsequent inferior status. But DuBois strongly challenged this mainstream view in his book, "Black Reconstruction in America," which documents the many positive things that were accomplished during Reconstruction due black legislators, among others. (But the text does not go into any of the detail DuBois does in his book.)
B. DuBois did not believe that human nature was inherently good or bad, but malleable. Similarly, he did not see racial prejudice as ineradicable.
1. Makes an interesting point about this as regards the newly freed slaves. See first paragraph, p. 300.
2. However, he did not see progress (on the racial front or otherwise) as inevitable. Note what the authors say about DuBois's optimism -- see last paragraph, p. 300.
CLASS, GENDER, AND RACE
A. DuBois clearly saw class and race as intertwined. He makes an interesting point how class seems to trump race when you're talking about the black middle class. Nonetheless, he felt (like himself) that the black middle class had an obligation to try to uplift the masses of Black poor. See last two paragraphs, p. 301.
B. He "...argued that no scientific definition of race is possible. Physical differences fade into each other almost imperceptibly." (p. 302) Talks about the "race construct" -- which I believe is what is meant today by the concept of the "social construction of race."
1. In this context, DuBois contended that racial discrimination preceeded prejudice and could reinforce it.
C. DuBois recognized the uplift of women as the next great movement (after racial uplift, that is). And he spoke forcefully on issues of women's suffrage and education for women. Other progressive points noted.
OTHER THEORIES AND THEORISTS
A. The authors make an intersting point with respect to DuBois's take on William Graham Sumner's Social Darwinist perspective. See middle paragraph, p. 304.
B. And in commenting on DuBois's drift toward Marxism, they quote from a letter Marx wrote to Abraham Lincoln in 1865. See bottom, p. 304 (a passage which suggests Marx was right on the money with this prediction, even if he was way off on some others.)
CRITIQUE AND CONCLUSIONS & FINAL THOUGHTS
A. The authors acknowledge his potential to have been a great national leader, if he had been white (as Gunnar Myrdal observed). DuBois's politics, especially his sympathy for communism, also marginalized him.
B. And he clearly was a committed scholar. DuBois clearly belongs in the research tradition of CRITICAL THEORY.
__________________________________
That brings us up to Chapter 13. I'll probably be blogging those notes over this weekend, and certainly before next Tuesday's (4/26) class.
A. DuBois shared Lenin's belief that IMPERIALISM basically represented the global reach of capitalist exploitation, focusing on how various European powers had carved up and where exploiting Africa for its raw materials and cheap labor.
1. Imperialism and colonialism sort of go hand-in-hand. And in Africa this gets rationalized by appealing to race theory -- notions of the racial inferiority of Blacks. See bottom paragraph, p. 295.
2. This is also linked to war -- "central to imperialist capitalism is war." (p. 296). He recognizes Veblen's point on sabotage and destruction of resources. And the cause of war (especially WW I)? See middle paragraph p. 296.
3. Nonehteless, he did not believe colonialism was here to stay. He predicted the emergence of independence movements in Africa and elsewhere as the major powers exhausted themselves in war.
Social Organization and Culture
A. "DuBois argued that the basic element in social organization is oppression,..." Referred to this as the MANURE theory of social organization. "By this, he meant the dregs of humanity are considered fit only to do tasks that no human being ought to have to do." Which leads into his "Theory of Exclusiveness" -- "...a feeling that the world progresses by a process of excluding from the benefits of culture the majority of men, so that a gifted minority may blossom." (blossom from the manure, that is) (p. 297)
B. Nonetheless, he certainly believed darker peoples had contributed to civilization development -- it is just that these contributions had been obscured by the ideology of white supremacy. (eg., regarding Egyptian civilization as a prime example of black African contributions, which I would add is a controversial claim even today.)
Leadership and Power
A. Nothing significant here, although when he talks about leaders mirroring the values and attributes most prized by their society, note the values and attributes he identifies as American -- "wealth, show, impudence." -- not very flattering and again sounding like Veblen.
B. "DOUBLE-CONSCIOUSNESS" -- this is a key concept for DuBois, which has resonated throughout African American history. As he describes it -- see bottom p. 298 - 299.
NATURE OF SOCIETY, HUMANS, AND CHANGE
A. Notes that DuBois exposed HISTORY AS IDEOLOGY -- how historians had unanimously argued that Blacks were responsible for the failure of Reconstruction and their subsequent inferior status. But DuBois strongly challenged this mainstream view in his book, "Black Reconstruction in America," which documents the many positive things that were accomplished during Reconstruction due black legislators, among others. (But the text does not go into any of the detail DuBois does in his book.)
B. DuBois did not believe that human nature was inherently good or bad, but malleable. Similarly, he did not see racial prejudice as ineradicable.
1. Makes an interesting point about this as regards the newly freed slaves. See first paragraph, p. 300.
2. However, he did not see progress (on the racial front or otherwise) as inevitable. Note what the authors say about DuBois's optimism -- see last paragraph, p. 300.
CLASS, GENDER, AND RACE
A. DuBois clearly saw class and race as intertwined. He makes an interesting point how class seems to trump race when you're talking about the black middle class. Nonetheless, he felt (like himself) that the black middle class had an obligation to try to uplift the masses of Black poor. See last two paragraphs, p. 301.
B. He "...argued that no scientific definition of race is possible. Physical differences fade into each other almost imperceptibly." (p. 302) Talks about the "race construct" -- which I believe is what is meant today by the concept of the "social construction of race."
1. In this context, DuBois contended that racial discrimination preceeded prejudice and could reinforce it.
C. DuBois recognized the uplift of women as the next great movement (after racial uplift, that is). And he spoke forcefully on issues of women's suffrage and education for women. Other progressive points noted.
OTHER THEORIES AND THEORISTS
A. The authors make an intersting point with respect to DuBois's take on William Graham Sumner's Social Darwinist perspective. See middle paragraph, p. 304.
B. And in commenting on DuBois's drift toward Marxism, they quote from a letter Marx wrote to Abraham Lincoln in 1865. See bottom, p. 304 (a passage which suggests Marx was right on the money with this prediction, even if he was way off on some others.)
CRITIQUE AND CONCLUSIONS & FINAL THOUGHTS
A. The authors acknowledge his potential to have been a great national leader, if he had been white (as Gunnar Myrdal observed). DuBois's politics, especially his sympathy for communism, also marginalized him.
B. And he clearly was a committed scholar. DuBois clearly belongs in the research tradition of CRITICAL THEORY.
__________________________________
That brings us up to Chapter 13. I'll probably be blogging those notes over this weekend, and certainly before next Tuesday's (4/26) class.
Wednesday, April 13, 2011
Lecture Notes
Since I failed to finish commenting on Max Weber in class yesterday (Tues. 4/12), I am going to do so on the blog, as well as post my lecture notes on Chapter 8, Georg Simmel. Remember, that I extended the deadline for the families to formulate a response to those articles on Weber's predictions about the future until next Tues., 4/19. But remember that essay II is due tomorrow.
________________
H. In connection with "ideal types," the authors briefly introduce an important aspect of Weber's work, which is his defense of the "DOCTRINE OF VALUE NEUTRALITY." It should be noted in this regard that "ideal types" are NOT ethical prescriptions, and so do not violate his argument that sociologists should be value neutral.
1. As the authors note at the bottom of p. 176: "Weber was particularly opposed to sociologists using their work to advance their own personal beliefs and values: the 'prophet and the demagogoue do not belong on the academic platform.' The 'elementary duty of scientific self-control' demanded a 'sharp distinction between the logically comparative analysis of reality by ideal-types in the logical sense and the value-judgment of reality on the basis of ideals.'"
2. This has essentially been the position on this issue that has been embraced by mainstream sociology. However, there was some challenge to this in the 1960s and 70s, and what emerged was a compromise position -- what I would call the "LET'S BE HONEST" position, which suggests that sociologists be honest about what biases they may have and by openly admitting them thereby allow people to take that into account in reading and evaluating their work. (which, I believe, is where the authors of this text stand, as reflected in their early discussion of the difference between IDEOLOGY and SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY.
I. On the issues of gender and race, it appears Weber was more enlightened than many of his colleagues.
1. Regarding gender, and probably because of the influence of his wife who was a feminist, he did embrace a more egalitarian view of the marriage relationship. He viewed women "primarily as human beings and only secondarily as members of the opposite sex." (p. 189) Nonetheless, he did not get away entirely from a "naturalistic" view of woman as primarily a sexual object, and he personally strayed from his monogamous relationship.
2. On race, I applaud his clear recognition of race as a SOCIAL, not a biological distinction ( a view that was not widely accepted at that time). See p. 188. And he makes a very telling point about race relations in the U.S. -- why race prejudice was deeper among poor whites. See bottom, p. 188.
Chapter 8: The Sociology of Form and Content: Simmel
A. A good way to introduce my brief exploration of the work of Georg Simmel would be to quote the very last sentence in the chapter -- "More than anything else,...Simmel was a philosophical sociologist concerned with how human beings can define their humanity in the context of an overwhelmingly objective culture." (p. 220)
B. Like Weber, Simmel acknowledged the growing industrialization, bureaucratization, rationalization of modern society (objective culture) especially in the modern metropolis, and how individuals experience or confront this.
1. He recognized that in many ways these developments represented progress, yet they also contributed to alienation and anomie. Or, to put this in somewhat different terms: to what extent has the scale of modern life overwhelmed and dominated individuals, and how can and should individuals respond to this?
C. Biographically, the authors highlight Simmel's struggles to secure an academic position, a major obstacle being the prevailing anti-Semitism, and the association of sociology with socialism, and in turn, socialism with Jewish intellectuals.
1. But there can be no doubt that Simmel lived in the midst of a vibrant intellectual community, and he himself would have a significant impact on several prominent, later sociologists such as Karl Mannheim, George Herbert Mead, and the Chicago School in general. His essay, "Metropolis and Mental Life" was itself highly influential in the development of urban sociology at the University of Chicago.
D. "Simmel regarded sociology as the study of social interaction." Although Simmel acknowledged that an entity called "society" did exist which confronts the individual, yet "...it was an entity whose 'reality' lay in the minds and actions of individual human beings." (p. 202)
1. Although I would not necessarily endorse the use of "dialectical" here, the authors go on to describe the relation of the individual to society in these terms. See mid., p. 203. (And I would question whether these "most private, internal impulses" are really independent of the larger social order.)
2. And on the very next page (p. 204 mid.), the authors underscore that for Simmel we all have a part of the self that is "outside" society, although this non-social element varies from person to person. (again, I wonder about that.)
E. Simmel also made some interesting observations about CONFLICT, especially the peculiar nature of conflict in Western societies, which is especially evident in modern metropolitan life. The following passage also captures well the phenomenon of the growing RATIONALIZATION and impersonality of modern life. See 2nd paragraph, p. 206.
F. Along these same lines, Simmel made some interesting and relevant points about modern society in his book, "The Philosophy of Money" (1900), which explored the way in which social relations are transformed by the modern money economy.
1. On the face of it, this sounds like Marx and his "historical materialism." But Simmel characterized his effort as getting "beneath" historical materialism to the more basic level of EXCHANGE as a form of social interaction among individuals.
2. Although he recognized ways in which exchange based on money might benefit society (p. 208), on balance, he saw its impact as negative (in terms not all that different from Marx). See top half of p. 209.
G. The so-called money economy becomes an important part of what Simmel calls OBECTIVE CULTURE, which comes to dominate individuals and closes off possibilities of individual expression and creativity. See 3rd & 4th paragraphs, p. 210, which brings out some of the adverse consequences of the domination of a money economy and objective culture.
1. Although such alienation seems most closely connected with capitalism, Simmel (like Weber) recognized the alienating potential of socialism and communism, which represent other forms of the domination of the individual by objective culture.
H. Simmel's views on gender appear to put him in the category of so many other theorists, endorsing a version of "Men are from Mars, Women from Venus" thesis -- that women are more "closely and deeply rooted in the dark, primitive forces of nature than are men." (p. 215) See also the very bottom of p. 215.
I. Finally, I believe the authors do a nice job of bringing together some of these broad themes in Simmel's work -- See top half of p. 219.
______________________________________
That brings us up to Section V & Chapter 9, which is where I will pick up tomorrow (Thurs., 4/14). Be sure to incorporate the above notes in your class notes, and pay special attention to the cited passages, especially to understand Simmel.
________________
H. In connection with "ideal types," the authors briefly introduce an important aspect of Weber's work, which is his defense of the "DOCTRINE OF VALUE NEUTRALITY." It should be noted in this regard that "ideal types" are NOT ethical prescriptions, and so do not violate his argument that sociologists should be value neutral.
1. As the authors note at the bottom of p. 176: "Weber was particularly opposed to sociologists using their work to advance their own personal beliefs and values: the 'prophet and the demagogoue do not belong on the academic platform.' The 'elementary duty of scientific self-control' demanded a 'sharp distinction between the logically comparative analysis of reality by ideal-types in the logical sense and the value-judgment of reality on the basis of ideals.'"
2. This has essentially been the position on this issue that has been embraced by mainstream sociology. However, there was some challenge to this in the 1960s and 70s, and what emerged was a compromise position -- what I would call the "LET'S BE HONEST" position, which suggests that sociologists be honest about what biases they may have and by openly admitting them thereby allow people to take that into account in reading and evaluating their work. (which, I believe, is where the authors of this text stand, as reflected in their early discussion of the difference between IDEOLOGY and SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY.
I. On the issues of gender and race, it appears Weber was more enlightened than many of his colleagues.
1. Regarding gender, and probably because of the influence of his wife who was a feminist, he did embrace a more egalitarian view of the marriage relationship. He viewed women "primarily as human beings and only secondarily as members of the opposite sex." (p. 189) Nonetheless, he did not get away entirely from a "naturalistic" view of woman as primarily a sexual object, and he personally strayed from his monogamous relationship.
2. On race, I applaud his clear recognition of race as a SOCIAL, not a biological distinction ( a view that was not widely accepted at that time). See p. 188. And he makes a very telling point about race relations in the U.S. -- why race prejudice was deeper among poor whites. See bottom, p. 188.
Chapter 8: The Sociology of Form and Content: Simmel
A. A good way to introduce my brief exploration of the work of Georg Simmel would be to quote the very last sentence in the chapter -- "More than anything else,...Simmel was a philosophical sociologist concerned with how human beings can define their humanity in the context of an overwhelmingly objective culture." (p. 220)
B. Like Weber, Simmel acknowledged the growing industrialization, bureaucratization, rationalization of modern society (objective culture) especially in the modern metropolis, and how individuals experience or confront this.
1. He recognized that in many ways these developments represented progress, yet they also contributed to alienation and anomie. Or, to put this in somewhat different terms: to what extent has the scale of modern life overwhelmed and dominated individuals, and how can and should individuals respond to this?
C. Biographically, the authors highlight Simmel's struggles to secure an academic position, a major obstacle being the prevailing anti-Semitism, and the association of sociology with socialism, and in turn, socialism with Jewish intellectuals.
1. But there can be no doubt that Simmel lived in the midst of a vibrant intellectual community, and he himself would have a significant impact on several prominent, later sociologists such as Karl Mannheim, George Herbert Mead, and the Chicago School in general. His essay, "Metropolis and Mental Life" was itself highly influential in the development of urban sociology at the University of Chicago.
D. "Simmel regarded sociology as the study of social interaction." Although Simmel acknowledged that an entity called "society" did exist which confronts the individual, yet "...it was an entity whose 'reality' lay in the minds and actions of individual human beings." (p. 202)
1. Although I would not necessarily endorse the use of "dialectical" here, the authors go on to describe the relation of the individual to society in these terms. See mid., p. 203. (And I would question whether these "most private, internal impulses" are really independent of the larger social order.)
2. And on the very next page (p. 204 mid.), the authors underscore that for Simmel we all have a part of the self that is "outside" society, although this non-social element varies from person to person. (again, I wonder about that.)
E. Simmel also made some interesting observations about CONFLICT, especially the peculiar nature of conflict in Western societies, which is especially evident in modern metropolitan life. The following passage also captures well the phenomenon of the growing RATIONALIZATION and impersonality of modern life. See 2nd paragraph, p. 206.
F. Along these same lines, Simmel made some interesting and relevant points about modern society in his book, "The Philosophy of Money" (1900), which explored the way in which social relations are transformed by the modern money economy.
1. On the face of it, this sounds like Marx and his "historical materialism." But Simmel characterized his effort as getting "beneath" historical materialism to the more basic level of EXCHANGE as a form of social interaction among individuals.
2. Although he recognized ways in which exchange based on money might benefit society (p. 208), on balance, he saw its impact as negative (in terms not all that different from Marx). See top half of p. 209.
G. The so-called money economy becomes an important part of what Simmel calls OBECTIVE CULTURE, which comes to dominate individuals and closes off possibilities of individual expression and creativity. See 3rd & 4th paragraphs, p. 210, which brings out some of the adverse consequences of the domination of a money economy and objective culture.
1. Although such alienation seems most closely connected with capitalism, Simmel (like Weber) recognized the alienating potential of socialism and communism, which represent other forms of the domination of the individual by objective culture.
H. Simmel's views on gender appear to put him in the category of so many other theorists, endorsing a version of "Men are from Mars, Women from Venus" thesis -- that women are more "closely and deeply rooted in the dark, primitive forces of nature than are men." (p. 215) See also the very bottom of p. 215.
I. Finally, I believe the authors do a nice job of bringing together some of these broad themes in Simmel's work -- See top half of p. 219.
______________________________________
That brings us up to Section V & Chapter 9, which is where I will pick up tomorrow (Thurs., 4/14). Be sure to incorporate the above notes in your class notes, and pay special attention to the cited passages, especially to understand Simmel.
Monday, April 4, 2011
FAMILY ACTIVITY II
Before I describe Family Activity II, let me call your attention to the previous blog post on Marx and Marxism, which you need to check out.
FAMILY ACTIVITY II: In light of the two xerox handouts I will distribute in class tomorrow (Tues., 4/5)("The Calvinist Manifesto" & "The Worship of Success"), in addition to the text's treatment of this aspect of Weber's work, I want each family to (jointly) compose a 1-2 page response to a couple basic questions: (1) how close or far away do you believe we are from realizing Weber's prediction? and (2) would you agree with Fukuyama (in "The Calvinist Manifesto") that religion, especially in America, has not faded in importance and that religion in general has served as an effective countervailing force in limiting the spread of the so-called "iron cage," OR would you say we are more like Schmookler describes (in "The Worship of Success")in which worshipping success is entirely secular, divested of any religious significance?
I will give you some class time on Thursday (4/7) and Tuesday (4/12) to confer with family members and compose a response. Then, a week from Thursday (4/14) I want a representative from each family to present your response to the class. I am not expecting these responses to be polished but they should at least be coherent. I am NOT going to ask you to submit your responses in writing. Immediately following these presentations, we will vote on what you believe was the best, most insightful response. I would suggest you encourage your family members to be in attendance so they can vote. However, let me remind you that if everyone just votes for their family, that my vote will be the tie breaker. I hope and trust that you can set aside family loyalty and vote for another family's response if you believe it is the best. We will do this by secret ballot.
All participating family members will earn 5 points for this exercise. The winning family will receive 2 bonus points.
FAMILY ACTIVITY II: In light of the two xerox handouts I will distribute in class tomorrow (Tues., 4/5)("The Calvinist Manifesto" & "The Worship of Success"), in addition to the text's treatment of this aspect of Weber's work, I want each family to (jointly) compose a 1-2 page response to a couple basic questions: (1) how close or far away do you believe we are from realizing Weber's prediction? and (2) would you agree with Fukuyama (in "The Calvinist Manifesto") that religion, especially in America, has not faded in importance and that religion in general has served as an effective countervailing force in limiting the spread of the so-called "iron cage," OR would you say we are more like Schmookler describes (in "The Worship of Success")in which worshipping success is entirely secular, divested of any religious significance?
I will give you some class time on Thursday (4/7) and Tuesday (4/12) to confer with family members and compose a response. Then, a week from Thursday (4/14) I want a representative from each family to present your response to the class. I am not expecting these responses to be polished but they should at least be coherent. I am NOT going to ask you to submit your responses in writing. Immediately following these presentations, we will vote on what you believe was the best, most insightful response. I would suggest you encourage your family members to be in attendance so they can vote. However, let me remind you that if everyone just votes for their family, that my vote will be the tie breaker. I hope and trust that you can set aside family loyalty and vote for another family's response if you believe it is the best. We will do this by secret ballot.
All participating family members will earn 5 points for this exercise. The winning family will receive 2 bonus points.
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