Thursday, April 28, 2011

Lecture Notes: Section VIII Intro. & Chapter 16: Critical Theory: The Frankfurt School and Habermas

Section VIII Criticism, Marxism, Change

A. Again, a brief and not very informative introduction. The authors begin by summarizing the previous section as being about "...the more-or-less 'official' twentieth-century conservative capitalist theory and ideology of functionalism." (p. 393)

B. Despite Marxist hopes for the demise of capitalism in the wake of the Russian Revolution, the Great Depression, etc., it did not happen and indeed the Stalinist regime in the Soviet Union led Marxist intellectuals to question it as a model.

C. Hence, the emergence in the 1920s of what is called The Frankfurt School, which attempted to account for the failures and shortcomings of Soviet-style socialism, as well as criticizing Western capitalism, but not strictly on economic grounds. These thinkers drew on other perspectives, especially Freudian psychoanalysis. (eg. Herbert Marcuse's "Eros and Civilization")


Chapter 16: Critical Theory: The Frankfurt School and Habermas

A. Let me preface my remarks on this chapter by observing that, for the most part, I believe the authors did a good job of presenting these ideas in relativiely jargon-free language. I am very familiar with the main Frankfurt School thinkers featured, having read a good many of their basic works. And although I have not gotten into Habermas, based on the authors' analysis, I believe there is much of value there which would warrant reading some of his major works.

B. The authors open the chapter with a very appropriate observation about what inspired many of these thinkers. See opening paragraph, p. 395.

1. And, as the end of the 20th century (and beginning of the 21st) approached, it seemed that capitalism was triumphant and dominant, not likely to be overthrown by a working class. So, how did this come about and what might the future hold? Will the widely recognized drawbacks of capitalism ever be addressed? (Parenthetically, this would be the kind of question someone using the "sociological imagination" would explore.)

C. The Institute for Social Research at the University of Frankfurt was established in 1921 in the wake of Germany's defeat in WW I and what seemed to be promising prospects for a socialist revolution there. It did not happen, of course. In fact, in a little more than a decade, Hitler would rise to power.

1. Many of the thinkers who became associated with the Insitute, such as its director, Max Horkheimer, were Jewish, and with anti-Semitism on the rise in the 1930s, they relocated their basis of operations to Columbia University (1934). Herbert Marcuse and Erich Fromm would go on to become important American social thinkers. (C. Wright Mills also hooked up with them there.)

2. The theorists of the Institute could loosely be described as "critical Marxists," but they represented many different fields -- art, music, literature, philosophy, psychoanalysis, etc. and there was not a unified theoretical perspective.

3. In terms of perspective, the authors describe the Institute's research as SUPRADISCIPLINARY, as they explain in the context of Marxism and their particular historical context. See bottom p. 396 - first paragraph, p. 397.

D. They give a brief biographical sketch of the four leading members -- Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, Fromm (mostly drawn from Martin Jay's fine book: "The Dialectical Imagination").

1. In terms of theoretical background, in addition to Marx of course, they were also influenced by the work of Hegel (by way of Georg Lukacs), Weber, Nietzche, and Freud -- quite an array of figures.

E. Beyond a narrower Marxist focus, these critical theorists were concerned that the whole premise of Enlightenment rationality (of achieving a more rational, liberal, equitable society) had been subverted. Reason had become "rationalization" which, as Max Weber noted, led to a bureaucratized, controlling state -- the "iron cage of rationality."

1. In this context, Max Horkheimer distinguished between two types of reason -- SUBJECTIVE vs. OBJECTIVE. (p. 399, bottom)

a.) SUBJECTIVE REASON, which is simply concerned with figuring out the most appropriate or efficient means to achieve any end or purpose, does not concern itself with the question of whether the purposes or ends are themselves "reasonable," just or equitable. Such INSTRUMENTAL reason, to take an extreme example, could be as easily used by the Nazi extermination industry as by institutions concerned with the elimination of poverty and suffering. (top, p. 400)

1.) And what they saw as the limitations of subjective reason extends to the whole positivist enterprise. See middle two paragraphs, p. 400. (eg. that survey research only deals with surface phenomena, as Mills also argued.)

2.) As I noted in my paper on Horkheimer's "Eclipse of Reason" -- "Subjective reason conforms to anything." (p. 25, Eclipse) And I went on to note -- "More than anything else, the dominance of subjective reason has meant the virtual preclusion of a critical perspective. That is to say, subjective reason provides no basis for criticism of existing social conditions;..."

b.) In contrast, OBJECTIVE REASON refers to reason as an instrument for determining social ends, of figuring out the objective world. This type of reason was the hopeful promise of the Enlightenment, which has, unfortunately, been transformed into instrumental, subjective reason in modern society.

1.) Objective reason insists that fundamental concepts such as truth, justice, right, wrong, etc. have meaning which is discoverable in the world. Thus, objective reason encompasses a CRITICAL perspective -- criticize the existing order of capitalism. (see my paper on "Eclipse of Reason")

2.) This objective reason is connected with EMANICIPATORY THEORY. See first two paragraphs, top, p.401.

F. Although theoretical critique -- emancipatory theory -- might point the way toward change, it does not guarantee it. Indeed, these Frankfurt School theorists were at pains to explain why a revolutionary working class consciousness had not developed. They were generally pessimistic about the prospects for change.

1. Increased consumption, the psychological domination of what they called "mass culture," undermined revolutionary thinking and practice. Georg Lukacs in "History and Class Consciousness" (1922) had observed that the proletariat had become prisoners of bourgeois ideas that capitalism and alienated labor were "natural," to be accepted, not criticized.

2. The authors also point out how these critical theorists saw the realization of Weber's view of the future as a bureaucratized, impersonal world of the iron cage.

G. Herbert Marcuse believed that we might be able to escape from this iron cage by a "GREAT REFUSAL" -- the refusal to buy into consumer society. He was hopeful that the counterculture movement of the 1960s represented this "great refusal." (unfortunately, a misplaced hope)

H. I am much less familiar with the work of Habermas and his particular reformulation along the lines of communication, creating "ideal speech communities." On the surface, it sounds pretty subjective to me. But his analysis of how capitalist society ahd managed to thwart any revolutionary movement is perceptive and consistent with the views of other members of the Frankfurt School. See bottom paragraph, p. 419 - top 2 paragraphs, p. 420.

I. Finally, the authors quote a nice statement from Habermas about how he felt critical theory is true to the origins of sociology. See passage from Habermas near bottom, p. 422.

And, read "Final Thoughts" (pp. 422-423), which I would add is relevant to "sociological imagination" and its relevance for our time.
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Look for lecture notes on Chapters 19 & 24 soon.

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